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Why the CLARITY Act Failed

On September 15, 2026, the US Senate voted on whether to begin debate on the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act, the bill the crypto industry had spent years pushing for. The motion needed 60 votes and got 49, with every Democrat and four Republicans voting against it. Because this vote only decided whether debate could start, the Senate never took up the bill itself and no part of it was argued on the floor. What blocked it was a clause on whether public officials can earn money from crypto while in office, not a disagreement about how crypto markets should be regulated. The result therefore says little about where the Senate stands on crypto rules, and a good deal about what has to be settled before a bill of this kind can pass.

The Gap the Bill Was Meant to Close

The bill was written to answer one question: which regulator is in charge. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) handles securities, which broadly means instruments like company shares. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) handles commodities, such as oil or wheat contracts. Crypto tokens have never fitted into either box, and no law has said where they belong. Firms have been left unable to tell which rulebook applies to them.

The CLARITY Act divided the job in law. Tokens on networks that are decentralised enough would count as digital commodities under the CFTC, which would gain new power over spot trading. Tokens still controlled by a known issuer would stay with the SEC. Bitcoin and Ethereum would get a clear legal status for the first time, and exchanges, brokers and dealers would have to register. The House passed this in July 2025 by 294 votes to 134, a wide margin with support from both parties. That margin, though, was a House number, and the House passes bills on a simple majority, so the ruling party does not need votes from the other side. The Senate works on a different rule: getting to debate takes 60 votes, and neither party holds that many on its own.

What the GENIUS Act Shows by Comparison

The most useful test of this failure is the one crypto bill that did become law. The GENIUS Act on stablecoins also lost a procedural vote, in May 2025. Democrats blocked it, talks followed, Republicans accepted changes, and the bill passed the Senate 68 to 30 in June before being signed in July. Two bills, the same chamber, the same industry, opposite results.

Two things separated them. The first was concession. To save GENIUS, Republicans took on Democratic demands, including disclosure of stablecoin holdings above $5,000 by members of Congress and executive officials, stronger protection for bank depositors in bankruptcy, and Treasury rules on suspicious transactions. On CLARITY, the counteroffer was turned down. Democrats asked for conflict-of-interest limits covering the President’s children and senior officials, with full sale of very large holdings, and Senator Cynthia Lummis rejected it before the vote. On this evidence, these bills pass when the majority gives something up, and stall when it does not.

The second was how much each bill covered. Stablecoins are one product with clear edges, so the bill upset few interests. Market structure touches the SEC, the CFTC, banks, decentralised finance and token issuers at the same time. Each added interest is another group that can hold back the votes needed for 60. A broad bill is not just a harder version of a narrow one. It needs more parties to agree at the same moment, which is a different kind of problem.

The Ethics Provision and Conflicts of Interest

The clause that blocked the bill has no crypto content in it. It deals with whether a sitting president should earn money from an industry his administration regulates. President Trump reported more than $1.4 billion in income from his family’s crypto ventures in 2025, including World Liberty Financial and the TRUMP memecoin. Democrats made an enforceable conflict-of-interest rule their price for support and held that position for over a year.

Republicans did move. A revised text released two days before the vote required officials with a substantial crypto interest to sell it or place it in a blind trust, and gave state attorneys general more enforcement power. The objections that followed were of two kinds, and the difference matters. One was about drafting: “substantial” was left undefined, which in practice lets the person being regulated decide whether the rule reaches him. The other was about structure: enforcement sat with the Department of Justice, now led by Todd Blanche, who was previously Trump’s defence lawyer. The first problem could have been solved by writing in a number. The second could not be solved by redrafting, because it asks one part of the executive branch to police its own head. Talks that treat the second kind of objection as the first kind rarely end in agreement, and these did not.

This is also a problem the industry helped create. Years of working closely with this administration produced results: the GENIUS Act, friendly appointments at the SEC and CFTC, dropped enforcement cases. The same closeness meant that by 2026 the industry’s main legislative goal could not be separated from the president’s own finances. Any senator voting on market structure was also voting on a framework that benefits a president earning over a billion dollars from the same sector.

Opposition from the Banking Industry

A second source of resistance drew less attention. Regional and community banks opposed parts of the bill that let crypto firms pay rewards to stablecoin holders, on the view that stablecoins paying a yield would pull deposits out of banks. The final text tried to settle this in the middle, blocking interest-like payments for simply holding a stablecoin while still allowing rewards tied to transactions or activity. Neither side was satisfied. Senator John Curtis, a Republican, said before the vote that he would allow debate but still opposed the bill, citing the effect on community bank deposits.

This may be the harder of the two obstacles. For most of the past decade, crypto’s opponent in Washington was the regulator, and a regulator can be convinced that a rule does not work. A bank asked to accept deposits leaving has nothing to be convinced about. That opposition will not change with the political weather, and it will be there in the next Congress whoever controls it.

The Role of Industry Political Spending

The vote also shows the limits of what crypto’s political spending can buy. Crypto firms and allied groups have put more than $300 million into the 2024 and 2026 election cycles together, about $189 million of it in this cycle. Fairshake, the main crypto super PAC, raised $137.4 million between January 2025 and July 2026 and still held around $113 million. By normal measures the industry was among the best-funded single-issue lobbies in Washington. It lost anyway.

The reason is not the amount. Campaign money mostly works by holding your own side together and discouraging defection. A cloture vote, which is a formal Senate procedure used to end a debate and force a final vote on a bill, motion or presidential nomination, does not respond to that. It needs 60 votes in a chamber where neither party holds 60 seats, so it needs help from the people the spending is meant to pressure. Spending on this scale also hands opponents a ready line about an industry buying its own rules, which strengthens the ethics objection instead of weakening it. The money put crypto on the agenda, which was a real gain, but it could not deliver the other side’s votes. Those are two separate tasks.

What Happens to Crypto Regulation Without the Bill

The result is not that the US has no crypto rules. It is that the rules will now be written by agencies alone, and an agency rule offers weaker certainty than a law. On the morning of the vote, SEC Chair Paul Atkins said the agency would deliver for investors and innovators with or without legislation. The SEC’s Regulation Crypto Assets proposal, published in August, is open for comment until October 20, 2026, and the CFTC under Chair Michael Selig is doing its own work.

Two limits matter. A law holds until Congress changes it, while a rule can be rewritten by the next administration through the same process that created it, which is what happened to US crypto policy between 2021 and 2025. A firm planning a multi-year investment cannot treat a rule that survives one election as settled. There is also a limit no amount of rulemaking fixes: the SEC can decide how tokens are sold and what must be disclosed, but it cannot give the CFTC authority over spot markets. Only Congress can do that. The gap CLARITY was written to close stays open, and the SEC’s own proposal says it does not settle questions about exchange, broker and dealer registration.

On timing, the position is poor but not closed. The midterms fall on November 3, senators leave Washington in early October, and the House recessed days after the vote. Senator Thom Tillis voted no so that he could file a motion to reconsider, which keeps the bill technically alive. The GENIUS case is the reason not to call this finished, since that bill also lost a procedural vote and became law two months later. But GENIUS recovered because the majority conceded, and whether CLARITY recovers depends on the same thing. If Democrats take the House in November, the members who set the agenda will be the ones who spent this year arguing that crypto legislation helps the president enrich himself.

Implications for Regulators Outside the US

The lesson from September 15 is about sequencing, not about crypto. The US had a supportive executive, regulators willing to act, a well-funded industry, and a House that had already passed the bill by a wide margin. It still could not produce a law, because the question of who profits from the industry was never separated from the question of how the industry should be run.

There is a practical point in that for other markets. Rules on market structure become easier to block once they can be presented as a favour to one set of firms, and that becomes easier the closer an industry sits to the people writing its rules. It also explains why regulator-led work has moved faster this year. Japan and the European Union both progressed without needing fresh legislative agreement, and in the US the SEC is now writing crypto rules that Congress did not deliver. The cost of that route is the same everywhere it is taken. What a regulator writes, a later regulator can rewrite, and the US has ended up relying on that route because the legislative one closed, not because it was preferred.

Key References

  1. Cloture vote on the motion to proceed to H.R. 3633, Digital Asset Market Clarity Act, US Senate, September 15, 2026 (49-50).
  2. NPR and CBS News reporting on the September 15, 2026 vote, covering the vote breakdown and the objection to DOJ enforcement.
  3. CNBC, “Senate cloture vote on Clarity Act fails,” September 15, 2026, on the revised text, ethics provisions and legislative calendar.
  4. Jones Day, “U.S. Senate Falls Short on Procedural Vote to Advance the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act,” September 2026.
  5. Jones Day and O’Melveny alerts on Senate passage of the GENIUS Act, 68-30, June 17, 2025, following its failed May 2025 cloture vote.
  6. Transparency International U.S., statements on CLARITY Act conflict-of-interest provisions, July 2026.
  7. Public Citizen and Federal Election Commission disclosures on crypto industry election spending, 2025-2026 cycle.
  8. SEC, Regulation Crypto Assets, Proposed Rule, Release Nos. 33-11434; 34-106150, August 21, 2026.
  9. H.R. 3633, Digital Asset Market Clarity Act, as passed by the US House of Representatives, July 2025 (294-134).